Self-serving cheap talk: A test of aumann's conjecture

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 33, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 177-194

  Charness, Gary ^a,b  

^a DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346484476     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1999.0776     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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