Fair procedures: Evidence from games involving lotteries

Economic Journal

Volumn 115, Issue 506, 2005, Pages 1054-1076

  Bolton, Gary E ^a   Brandts, Jordi ^a   Ockenfels, Axel ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GAMBLING;

EID: 28244449840     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: 14680297     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2005.01032.x     Document Type: Review

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