Fairness and contract design

Econometrica

Volumn 75, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 121-154

  Fehr, Ernst ^a,b   Klein, Alexander ^d   Schmidt, Klaus M ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

^b Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Collegium Helveticum   (Switzerland)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

^d NONE

Author keywords

Bonus contract; Fairness; Incentives; Inequity aversion; Moral hazard; Trust contract

Indexed keywords

EID: 33846677832     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: 14680262     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00734.x     Document Type: Article

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