Collective action as a social exchange

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 39, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 341-369

  Gächter, Simon ^a   Fehr, Ernst ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Collective actions; Experiments; Social exchange; Social pressure; Voluntary cooperation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033163906     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-2681(99)00045-1     Document Type: Article

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