Social comparisons in ultimatum bargaining

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Volumn 106, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 495-510

  Bohnet, Iris ^a   Zeckhauser, Richard ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Experimental bargaining; Social comparisons; Ultimatum game

Indexed keywords

BARGAINING; EQUITY; INCOME DISTRIBUTION; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 10444231966     PISSN: 03470520     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0347-0520.2004.00376.x     Document Type: Article

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