Trust and Trustworthiness in a Sequential Bargaining Game

Journal of Behavioral Decision Making

Volumn 16, Issue 5, 2003, Pages 331-340

  Chaudhuri, Ananish ^a,b   Khan, Sarah Ali ^b   Lakshmiratan, Aishwarya ^b   Py, Anne Laure ^b   Shah, Lisa ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND   (New Zealand)

^b WELLESLEY COLLEGE   (United States)

^c Asia Society   (United States)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Reciprocity; Sequential game; Social values orientation; Trust

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346901958     PISSN: 08943257     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/bdm.449     Document Type: Article

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