Social learning in recurring games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 21, Issue 1-2, 1997, Pages 102-134

  Jackson, Matthew O ^a   Kalai, Ehud ^b  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031256584     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0583     Document Type: Article

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