Social learning and coordination conventions in intergenerational games: An experimental study

Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 111, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 498-529

  Schotter, Andrew ^a   Sopher, Barry ^b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY; LEARNING;

EID: 0041624473     PISSN: 00223808     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/374187     Document Type: Article

References (25)

1. Berg, Joyce; Dickhaut, John W.; and McCabe, Kevin A. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History." Games and Econ. Behavior 10 (July 1995): 122-42.
2. Bisin, Alberto, and Verdier, Thierry. "'Beyond the Melting Pot': Cultural Transmission, Marriage, and the Evolution of Ethnic and Religious Traits." Q.J.E. 115 (August 2000): 955-88.
3. Boyd, Robert, and Richerson, Peter J. Culture and the Evolutionary Process. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press, 1985.
4. Cavalli-Sforza, Luigi L., and Feldman, Marcus W. Cultural Transmission and Evolution: A Quantitative Approach. Princeton, NJ.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1981.
5. Cooper, Russell; DeJong, Douglas V.; Forsythe, Robert; and Ross, Thomas W. "Communication in the Battle of the Sexes Game: Some Experimental Results." Rand J. Econ. 20 (Winter 1989): 568-87.
6. Cooper, Russell;DeJong, Douglas V.; Forsythe, Robert; and Ross, Thomas W. "Communication in Coordination Games." Q.J.E. 107 (May 1992): 739-71.
7. Crémer, Jacques. "Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations." Q.J.E. 101 (February 1986): 33-49.
8. Fudenberg, Drew, and Maskin, Eric. "Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games." A.E.R. Papers and Proc. 80 (May 1990): 274-79.
9. Jackson, Matthew O., and Kalai, Ehud. "Social Learning in Recurring Games." Games and Econ. Behavior 21 (October-November 1997): 102-34.
10. Kandori, Michihiro. "Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players." Rev. Econ. Studies 59 (January 1992): 81-92.
11. Kandori, Michihiro; Mailath, George J.; and Rob, Rafael. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games." Econometrica 61 (January 1993): 29-56.
12. Nyarko, Yaw, and Schotter, Andrew. "An Experimental Study of Belief Learning Using Elicited Beliefs." Econometrica 70 (May 2002): 971-1005.
13. Ottaviani, Marco, and Sorensen, Peter. "Professional Advice." Manuscript. London: Univ. Coll. London, Dept. Econ., 1999.
14. Quandt, Richard E. "The Estimation of the Parameters of a Linear Regression System Obeying Two Separate Regimes." J. American Statis. Assoc. 53 (December 1958): 873-80.
15. Salant, David J. "A Repeated Game with Finitely Lived Overlapping Generations of Players." Games and Econ. Behavior 3 (May 1991): 244-59.
16. Samuelson, Larry. Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997.
17. Samuelson, Larry, and Zhang, Jianbo. "Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games." J. Econ. Theory 57 (August 1992): 363-91.
18. Schotter, Andrew. The Economic Theory of Social Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981.
19. Schotter, Andrew, and Sopher, Barry. "Social Learning and Coordination Conventions in Inter-generational Games: An Experiment in Lamarckian Evolutionary Dynamics." Economic Research Report no. 2000-01. New York: New York Univ., Starr Center Appl. Econ., January 2000.
20. Ullmann-Margalit, Edna. The Emergence of Norms. Oxford: Clarendon, 1977.
21. Vega-Redondo, Fernando. Evolution, Games, and Economic Behaviour. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1996.
22. Weibull, Jorgen W. Evolutionary Game Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995.
23. Young, H. Peyton. "The Evolution of Conventions." Econometrica 61 (January 1993): 57-84.
24. Young, H. Peyton. "The Economics of Convention." J. Econ. Perspectives 10 (Spring 1996): 105-22.
25. Young, H. Peyton. Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1998.