Repetition and signalling: Experimental evidence from games with efficient equilibria

Economics Letters

Volumn 70, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 357-362

  Clark, Kenneth ^a   Sefton, Martin ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER   (United Kingdom)

^b NEWCASTLE UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

C92; Coordination; Experimental games; Repetition; Signaling

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035587196     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00381-5     Document Type: Article

References (9)

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