Economic experiments and environmental policy

Annual Review of Resource Economics

Volumn 6, Issue 1, 2014, Pages 319-337

  Noussair, Charles N ^a   Van Soest, Daan P ^a,b  

^a TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

cooperation; experiment; markets; resource economics

Indexed keywords

EID: 84908279521     PISSN: 19411340     EISSN: 19411359     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev-resource-091912-151833     Document Type: Article

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