Positive interactions promote public cooperation

Science

Volumn 325, Issue 5945, 2009, Pages 1272-1275

  Rand, David G ^a,b   Dreber, Anna ^a,c   Ellingsen, Tore ^c   Fudenberg, Drew ^a   Nowak, Martin A ^a,b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c STOCKHOLM SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COLLECTIVE ACTION; COMPARATIVE STUDY; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EXPERIMENTAL STUDY; PARTICIPATORY APPROACH; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

ARTICLE; CONTROLLED STUDY; COOPERATION; GAME; HUMAN; HUMAN EXPERIMENT; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PUBLIC RELATIONS; PUNISHMENT; REWARD; SOCIAL INTERACTION;

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAMES, EXPERIMENTAL; HUMANS; INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS; PUNISHMENT; REWARD;

EID: 69949167050     PISSN: 00368075     EISSN: 10959203     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1126/science.1177418     Document Type: Article

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41. We thank F. Racimo and J. Paci for assistance in performing the experiments. Support from the John Templeton Foundation, the National Science Foundation-National Institutes of Health joint program in mathematical biology, and J. Epstein, as well as the Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation (A.D.) and the Torsten and Ragnar Söderberg Foundation (T.E.), is gratefully acknowledged.