An efficient ascending-bid auction for multiple objects

American Economic Review

Volumn 94, Issue 5, 2004, Pages 1452-1475

  Ausubel, Lawrence M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 9744281439     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/0002828043052330     Document Type: Article

References (46)

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