The design of "Smart" water market institutions using laboratory experiments

Environmental and Resource Economics

Volumn 17, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 375-394

  Murphy, James J ^a   Dinar, Ariel ^b   Howitt, Richard E ^c   Rassenti, Steven J ^d   Smith, Vernon L ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS   (United States)

^b WORLD BANK   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

Auctions; Laboratory experiments; Mechanism design; Water markets

Indexed keywords

METHODOLOGY; WATER ECONOMICS; WATER MANAGEMENT; WATER PLANNING;

UNITED STATES;

EID: 0034494660     PISSN: 09246460     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1026598014870     Document Type: Article

References (14)

1. A calibration method for agricultural economic production models
2. Positive mathematical programming
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4. Contestability in the presence of an alternate market: An experimental evaluation
5. Designing 'Smart' computer-assisted markets: An experimental auction for gas networks
6. Smart computer-assisted markets
7. Designing a uniform-price double auction
8. Dimensions of parallelism: Some policy applications of experimental methods
9. Cotenancy and competition in an experimental auction market for natural gas pipeline networks
10. Relevance of laboratory experiments to testing resource allocation theory
11. Microeconomic systems as an experimental science