An experimental analysis of compliance in dynamic emissions markets

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 62, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 414-429

  Stranlund, John K ^a   Murphy, James J ^b   Spraggon, John M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA ANCHORAGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Compliance; Emissions trading; Enforcement; Laboratory experiments; Permit banking; Permit markets

Indexed keywords

COMPLIANCE; EMISSIONS TRADING; ENFORCEMENT; LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS; PERMIT BANKING; PERMIT MARKETS;

EMISSION CONTROL; EXPERIMENTS;

COMMERCE;

BANKING; DESIGN; EMISSIONS TRADING; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; EXPERIMENTAL STUDY; MARKET SYSTEM;

EID: 80955151583     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: 10960449     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2010.10.010     Document Type: Article

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