Price formation in single call markets

Econometrica

Volumn 65, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 311-345

  Cason, Timothy N ^a   Friedman, Daniel ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Auctions; Bayesian Nsh equilibrium; Experiments; Learning

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000866795     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2171895     Document Type: Article

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