The design, testing and implementation of Virginia's NOx allowance auction

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 69, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 190-200

  Porter, David ^a   Rassenti, Stephen ^a   Shobe, William ^b   Smith, Vernon ^a   Winn, Abel ^c  

^a CHAPMAN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

^c WICHITA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Combinatorial auctions; Experimental economics; Tradeable emission allowances

Indexed keywords

EID: 58649086941     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2007.09.007     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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