EPA's new emissions trading mechanism: A laboratory evaluation

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 30, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 133-160

  Cason, Timothy N ^a   Plott, Charles R ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030047938     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeem.1996.0010     Document Type: Article

References (18)

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