Local environmental control and institutional crowding-out

World Development

Volumn 28, Issue 10, 2000, Pages 1719-1733

  Cardenas, Juan Camilo ^a   Stranlund, John ^b   Willis, Cleve ^b  

^a PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD JAVERIANA   (Colombia)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS   (United States)

Author keywords

Colombia; Experiments; External regulation; Institutional crowding out; Local environmental quality; South America

Indexed keywords

ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT; ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY; REGULATORY FRAMEWORK; WELFARE ECONOMICS;

COLOMBIA;

EID: 0033771529     PISSN: 0305750X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0305-750X(00)00055-3     Document Type: Article

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