What Does It Mean to be Biased. Motivated Reasoning and Rationality.

Psychology of Learning and Motivation - Advances in Research and Theory

Volumn 61, Issue , 2014, Pages 41-102

  Hahn, Ulrike ^a   Harris, Adam J L ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Accuracy; Bias; Judgment; Motivated reasoning; Rationality

Indexed keywords

EID: 84899785372     PISSN: 00797421     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-12-800283-4.00002-2     Document Type: Chapter

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