An objective justification of bayesianism II: The consequences of minimizing inaccuracy

Philosophy of Science

Volumn 77, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 236-262

  Leitgeb, Hannes ^a   Pettigrew, Richard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77951202856     PISSN: 00318248     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/651318     Document Type: Article

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