Testimony and argument: A bayesian perspective

Bayesian Argumentation: The Practical Side of Probability

Volumn , Issue , 2013, Pages 15-38

  Hahn, Ulrike ^a,b   Oaksford, Mike ^b   Harris, Adam J L ^c  

^a CARDIFF UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84998983304     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-5357-0_2     Document Type: Chapter

References (81)

1. Achinstein, P. (1987). Concepts of evidence. Mind, 87, 22-45.
2. Adams, E. W. (1998). A primer of probability logic. Stanford: CSLI.
3. Adler, J. (2006). Epistemological problems of testimony. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford: Stanford University.
4. Birnbaum, M. H., & Mellers, B. (1983). Bayesian inference: Combining base rates with opinions of sources who vary in credibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45, 792-804.
5. Birnbaum, M. H., & Stegner, S. E. (1979). Source credibility in social judgment: Bias, expertise and the judge’s point of view. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 48-74.
6. Birnbaum, M. H., Wong, R., & Wong, L. K. (1976). Combining information from sources that vary in credibility. Memory & Cognition, 4, 330-336.
7. Blamey, J. (this volume). Upping the stakes and the preface paradox. In F. Zenker (Ed.), Bayesian argumentation: The practical side of probability (pp. xx-xx). Dordrecht: Springer
8. Bovens, L., & Hartmann, S. (2003). Bayesian epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
9. Bowell, T., & Kemp, G. (2002). Critical thinking: A concise guide. London: Routledge.
10. Carlson, K., & Russo, J. (2001). Biased interpretation of evidence by mock jurors. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 7, 91-103.
11. Chaiken, S. (1980). Heuristic versus systematic information processing and the use of source versus message cues in persuasion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 752-766.
12. Coady, C. A. J. (1992). Testimony: A philosophical study. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
13. Cohen, L. J. (1982). What is necessary for testimonial corroboration? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 33, 161-164.
14. Copi, I. M., & Cohen, C. (1994). Introduction to logic (9th ed.). New York: Macmillan.
15. Corner, A., & Hahn, U. (2009). Evaluating science arguments: Evidence, uncertainty & argument strength. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 15, 199-212.
16. Corner, A. J., Hahn, U., & Oaksford, M. (2011). The psychological mechanism of the slippery slope argument. Journal of Memory and Language, 64, 153-170.
17. Eagly, A. H., & Chaiken, S. (1993). The psychology of attitudes. Belmont: Thompson/Wadsworth.
18. Eaton, T. E., & O’Callaghan, M. G. (2001). Child-witness and defendant credibility: child evidence presentation mode and judicial instructions. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 31, 1845-1858.
19. ForsterLee, L., Horowitz, I. A., Athaide-Victor, E., & Brown, N. (2000). The bottom line: the effect of written expert witness statements on juror verdicts and information processing. Law and Human Behavior, 24, 259-270.
20. Friedman, R. (1987). Route analysis of credibility and hearsay. Yale Law Journal, 96, 667-742.
21. Goldman, A. I. (1999). Knowledge in a social world. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
22. Grabmair, M., & Ashley, K. D. (this volume). A survey of uncertainties and their consequences in probabilistic legal argumentation. In F. Zenker (Ed.), Bayesian argumentation: The practical side of probability (pp. xx-xx). Dordrecht: Springer.
23. Graham, P. J. (1997). What is testimony? Philosophical Quarterly, 47, 227-232.
24. Hahn, U., & Oaksford, M. (2006a). A Bayesian approach to informal argument fallacies. Synthese, 152, 207-236.
25. Hahn, U., & Oaksford, M. (2006b). Why a normative theory of argument strength and why might one want it to be Bayesian? Informal Logic, 26, 1-24.
26. Hahn, U., & Oaksford, M. (2007a). The rationality of informal argumentation: A Bayesian approach to reasoning fallacies. Psychological Review, 114, 704-732.
27. Hahn, U., & Oaksford, M. (2007b). The burden of proof and its role in argumentation. Argumentation, 21, 39-61.
28. Hahn, U., Harris, A. J. L., & Corner, A. J. (2009). Argument content and argument source: An exploration. Informal Logic, 29, 337-367.
29. Hahn, U. (2011). The problem of circularity in evidence, argument and explanation. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6, 172-182.
30. Harris, P. L., & Corriveau, K. H. (2011). Young children’s selective trust in informants. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 366, 1179-1190.
31. Hughes, W., Lavery, J., & Doran, K. (2010). Critical thinking: An introduction to the basic skills (6th ed.). Peterborough: Broadview Press.
32. Hume, D. (1977) An enquiry concerning human understanding (E. Steinberg, Ed.). Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
33. Jarvstad, A., & Hahn, U. (2011). Source reliability and the conjunction fallacy. Cognitive Science, 35, 682-711.
34. Johnson, R. H. (2000). Manifest rationality: A pragmatic theory of argument. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
35. Krauss, D. A., & Sales, B. D. (2001). The effects of clinical and scientific expert testimony on juror decision making in capital sentencing. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 7, 267-310.
36. Kruglanski, A. W., & Stroebe, W. (2005). The influence of beliefs and goals on attitudes: Issues of structure, function, and dynamics. In D. Albarracin, B. T. Johnson, & M. P. Zanna (Eds.), The handbook of attitudes (pp. 323-369). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
37. Kusch, M., & Lipton, P. (2002). Testimony: A primer. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 33, 209-217.
38. Kyburg, H. E., Jr. (1961). Probability and the logic of rational belief. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press.
39. Lagnado, D. A., Fenton, N., & Neil, M. (2012). Legal idioms: A framework for evidential reasoning. Argument and Computation, 4, 1-18. Online first.
40. Loftus, E. F. (1975). Leading questions and the eyewitness report. Cognitive Psychology, 7, 560-572.
41. Makinson, D. C. (1965). The paradox of the preface. Analysis, 25, 205-207.
42. Oaksford, M., & Hahn, U. (2004). A Bayesian approach to the argument from ignorance. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58, 75-85.
43. Oaksford, M., & Hahn, U. (this volume). Why are we convinced by the Ad Hominem argument?: Bayesian source reliability or pragma-dialectical discussion rules. In F. Zenker (Ed.), Bayesian argumentation: The practical side of probability (pp. xx-xx). Dordrecht: Springer.
44. Olsson, E. J. (this volume). A Bayesian simulation model of group deliberation. In F. Zenker (Ed.), Bayesian argumentation: The practical side ofprobability (pp. xx-xx). Dordrecht: Springer.
45. Pearl, J. (1988). Probabilistic reasoning in intelligent systems. San Mateo: Morgan Kaufman.
46. Perelman, C., & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1969). The new rhetoric: A treatise on argumentation. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
47. Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1984). Source factors and the elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. Advances in Consumer Research, 11, 668-672.
48. Petty, R. E., & Wegener, D. T. (1999). The elaboration likelihood model: Current status and controversies. In S. Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds.), Dual process theories in social psychology (pp. 41-72). New York: Guilford Press.
49. Petty, R. E., Cacioppo, J. T., & Goldman, R. (1981). Personal involvement as a determinant of argument-based persuasion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 41, 847-855.
50. Pollock, J. L. (2001). Defeasible reasoning with variable degrees of justification. Artificial Intelligence, 133, 233-282.
51. Pollock, J. L. (1995). Cognitive carpentry. Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT Press.
52. Pornpitakpan, C. (2004). The persuasiveness of source credibility: A critical review of five decades’ evidence. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 34, 243-281.
53. Prakken, H., & Vreeswijk, G. A. W. (2002). Logics for defeasible argumentation. In D. M. Gabbay & F. Guenthner (Eds.), Handbook of philosophical logic (2nd ed., Vol. 4, pp. 219-318). Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic.
54. Rainbolt, G. W., & Dwyer, S. L. (2012). Critical thinking: The art of argument. Boston: Wadsworth.
55. Ratneshwar, R., & Chaiken, S. (1991). Comprehension’s role in persuasion: The case of its moderating effect on the persuasive impact of source cues. Journal of Consumer Research, 18, 52-63.
56. Reimer, T., Mata, R., & Stoecklin, M. (2004). The use of heuristics in persuasion: Deriving cues on source expertise from argument quality. Current Research in Social Psychology, 10, 69.
57. Rescher, N. (1976). Plausible reasoning. Assen: Van Gorcum. Rescher, N. (1977). Dialectics: A controversy-oriented approach to the theory of knowledge. Albany: State University of New York Press.
58. Schuller, R. A., Terry, D., & McKimmie, B. (2001). The impact of an expert’s gender on jurors’ decisions. Law and Psychology Review, 25, 59-79.
59. Schum, D. A. (1981). Sorting out the effects of witness sensitivity and response-criterion placement upon the inferential value of testimonial evidence. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 27, 153-196.
60. Schum, D. A. (1994). The evidential foundations of probabilistic reasoning. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
61. Shogenji, T. (2000). Self-dependent justification without circularity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 51, 287-298.
62. Shogenji, T. (this volume). Reductio, coherence, and the myth of epistemic circularity. In F. Zenker (Ed.), Bayesian argumentation: The practical side of probability (pp. xx-xx). Dordrecht: Springer.
63. Skolnick, P., & Shaw, J. I. (2001). A comparison of eyewitness and physical evidence on Mock-Juror decision making. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 28, 614-630. doi:10.1177/009385480102800504.
64. Thompson, V. A., Evans, J. S., & Handley, S. J. (2005). Persuading and dissuading by conditional argument. Journal of Memory and Language, 53, 238-257.
65. Tindale, C. W. (2007). Fallacies and argument appraisal. New York: Cambridge University Press.
66. Toulmin, S. (1958). The uses of argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
67. Tucker, A. (2005). Miracles, historical testimonies, and probabilities. History and Theory, 44, 373-390.
68. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review, 90, 293-315.
69. van Eemeren, F. H., & Grootendorst, R. (2004). A systematic theory of argumentation. The pragma-dialectical approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
70. Verheij, B. (2003). Dialectical argumentation with argumentation schemes: An approach to legal logic. Artificial intelligence and Law, 11, 167-195.
71. Walton, D. N. (1992). Rules for plausible reasoning. Informal Logic, Vol XIV, 33-51.
72. Walton, D. N. (1996). Argument schemes for presumptive reasoning. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum.
73. Walton, D. (1997). Appeal to expert opinion. University Park: Pennsylvania State Press.
74. Walton, D. N. (1998). Ad Hominem arguments. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press.
75. Walton, D. M. (2001). Abductive, presumptive, and plausible arguments. Informal Logic, 21, 141-169.
76. Walton, D. N. (2004). Relevance in argumentation. Mahwah: Erlbaum.
77. Walton, D. N. (2008). Witness testimony evidence: argumentation, artificial intelligence, and law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
78. Walton, D., Reed, C., & Macagno, F. (2008). Argumentation schemes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
79. Weinstock, M., & Flaton, R. (2004). Evidence coverage and argument skills: cognitive factors in a juror’s verdict choice. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 17, 191-212.
80. Wells, G. L., & Olsen, E. A. (2003). Eyewitness testimony. Annual Review of Psychology, 54, 277-295.
81. Wheeler, G. (2007). A review of the lottery paradox. In W. Harper & G. Wheeler (Eds.), Probability and inference: Essays in honour of Henry E. Kyburg, Jr (pp. 1-31). London: King’s College Publications.