Probability Theory, Not the Very Guide of Life

Psychological Review

Volumn 116, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 856-874

  Juslin, Peter ^a   Nilsson, Håkan ^a   Winman, Anders ^a  

^a UPPSALA UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

additive integration; base rate neglect; conjunction error; probability judgment; representativeness heuristic

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; BAYES THEOREM; COMPUTER SIMULATION; DECISION MAKING; DECISION THEORY; HUMAN; PROBLEM SOLVING; STATISTICAL MODEL; SYSTEM ANALYSIS;

BAYES THEOREM; COMPUTER SIMULATION; DECISION MAKING; DECISION THEORY; HUMANS; JUDGMENT; LINEAR MODELS; PROBABILITY THEORY; PROBLEM SOLVING;

EID: 70350462742     PISSN: 0033295X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1037/a0016979     Document Type: Article

References (96)

1. Abelson R.E., Leddo J., and Gross P.H. The strength of conjunctive explanations. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 13 (1987) 141-155
2. Ajzen I. Intuitive theories of events and the effects of base-rate information on prediction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 35 (1977) 303-313
3. Anderson N.H. Foundations of information integration theory (1981), Academic Press, New York, NY
4. Anderson N.H. A functional theory of cognition (1996), Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ
5. Birnhaum M.H., and Mellers B.A. Bayesian inference: Combining base-rates with opinions of sources who vary in credibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 45 (1983) 792-804
6. Björkman M. Internal cue theory: Calibration and resolution of confidence in general knowledge. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 58 (1994) 386-405
7. Bonini N., Tentori K., and Osherson D. A different conjunction fallacy. Mind & Language 19 (2004) 199-210
8. Brehmer A., and Brehmer B. What have we learned about human judgment from thirty years of policy capturing. In: Brehmer B., and Joyce C.R.B. (Eds). Human judgment: The SJT view (1988), Elsevier Science, Amsterdam, the Netherlands 75-114
9. Brehmer B. The psychology of linear judgment models. Acta Psychologica 87 (1994) 137-154
10. Brunswik E. The conceptual framework of psychology (1952), University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL
11. Budescu D.V., Wallsten T.S., and Au W.T. On the importance of random error in the study of probability judgment: Part II. Applying the stochastic judgment model to detect systematic trends. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 10 (1997) 172-188
12. Butler J. Analogy of religion, natural and revealed, to the constitution and nature (1736), Knapton, London, England
13. Cooksey R.W. Judgment analysis: Theory, methods, and applications (1996), Academic Press, San Diego, CA
14. Costello F.J. How probability theory explains the conjunction fallacy. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 22 (2009) 213-234 doi:10.1002/bdm.618
15. Cowan N. The magical number 4 in short-term memory: A reconsideration of mental storage capacity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (2001) 87-185
16. Dawes R.M. The robust beauty of improper linear models in decision making. American Psychologist 34 (1979) 571-582
17. Dhami M., Hertwig R., and Hoffrage U. The role of representative design in an ecological approach to cognition. Psychological Bulletin 130 (2004) 959-988
18. Dougherty M.R.P., and Hunter J.E. Hypothesis generation, probability judgment, and individual difference in working memory capacity. Acta Psychologica 113 (2003) 263-282
19. Eddy D.M. Probabilistic reasoning in clinical medicine: Problems and opportunities. In: Kahneman D., Slovic P., and Tversky A. (Eds). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases (1982), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England 249-267
20. Edwards W. Conservatism in human information processing. In: Kahneman D., Slovic P., and Tversky A. (Eds). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases (1982), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England 359-369
21. Einhorn J.H. A model of the conjunction fallacy (1985) Working paper, Center for Decision Research, University of Chicago
22. Einhorn J.H., Kleinmuntz D.N., and Kleinmuntz B. Regression models and process tracing analysis. Psychological Review 86 (1979) 465-485
23. Erev I., Wallsten T.S., and Budescu D.V. Simultaneous over- and underconfidence: The role of error in judgment processes. Psychological Review 101 (1994) 519-527
24. Fantino E., Kulik J., Stolarz-Fantino S., and Wright W. The conjunction fallacy: A test of averaging hypotheses. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 4 (1997) 96-101
25. Fiedler K. Beware of samples! A cognitive-ecological sampling approach to judgment biases. Psychological Review 107 (2000) 659-676
26. Fiedler K., and Juslin P. Taking the interface between mind and environment seriously. In: Fiedler K., and Juslin P. (Eds). Information sampling and adaptive cognition (2006), Cambridge University Press, New York, NY 3-32
27. Fischhoff B., Slovic P., and Lichtenstein S. Subjective sensitivity analysis. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 23 (1979) 339-359
28. Fisk J.E., and Pidgeon N. Component probabilities and the conjunction fallacy: Resolving signed summation and the low component model in a contingent approach. Acta Psychologica 94 (1996) 1-20
29. Fisk J.E., and Pidgeon N. The conjunction fallacy: The case for the existence of competing heuristic strategies. British Journal of Psychology 88 (1997) 1-27
30. Fisk J.E., and Pidgeon N. Conditional probabilities, potential surprise, and the conjunction fallacy. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 51 A (1998) 655-681
31. Gaissmaier W., Schooler L.J., and Rieskamp J. Simple predictions fueled by capacity limitations: When are they successful?. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 32 (2006) 966-982
32. Gavanski I., and Roskos-Ewoldsen D.R. Representativeness and conjoint probability. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 61 (1991) 181-194
33. Gigerenzer G. On narrow norms and vague heuristics: A rebuttal to Kahneman and Tversky (1996). Psychological Review 103 (1996) 592-596
34. Gigerenzer G., and Goldstein D.G. Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality. Psychological Review 103 (1996) 650-669
35. Gigerenzer G., Hell W., and Blank H. Presentation and content: The use of base-rates as a continuous variable. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 14 (1988) 513-525
36. Gigerenzer G., and Hoffrage U. How to improve Bayesian reasoning without instruction: Frequency formats. Psychological Review 102 (1995) 684-704
37. Gigerenzer G., Hoffrage U., and Kleinbölting H. Probabilistic mental models: A Brunswikian theory of confidence. Psychological Review 98 (1991) 506-528
38. Gigerenzer G., Swijtink Z., Porter T., Daston L., Beatty J., and Kruger L. The empire of chance: How probability changed science and everyday life (1989), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England
39. Gigerenzer G., Todd P.M., and the ABC Research Group. Simple heuristics that make us smart (1999), Oxford University Press, New York, NY
40. Gilovich T., Griffin D.W., and Kahneman D. Inferences, heuristics, and biases: New directions in judgment under uncertainty (2002), Cambridge University Press, New York, NY
41. Glöckner A., and Betsch T. Multiple-reason decision making based on automatic processing. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 34 (2008) 1055-1075
42. Hacking I. The emergence of probability: A philosophical study of early ideas about probability, induction, and statistical inference (1975), Cambridge University Press, London, England
43. Hammond K.R. Human judgment and social policy: Irreducibly uncertainty, inevitable error, unavoidable injustice (1996), Oxford University Press, New York, NY
44. Hammond K.R., and Stewart T.R. The essential Brunswik: Beginnings, explications, applications (2001), Oxford University Press, Oxford, England
45. Hansson P., Juslin P., and Winman A. The role of short-term memory and task experience for overconfidence in judgment under uncertainty. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 34 (2008) 1027-1042
46. Hansson P., Rönnlund M., Juslin P., and Nilsson L.-G. Adult age differences in the realism of confidence judgments: Overconfidence, format dependence, and cognitive predictors. Psychology and Aging 23 (2008) 531-544
47. Hertwig R., and Gigerenzer G. The "conjunction fallacy" revisited: How intelligent inferences look like reasoning errors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 12 (1999) 275-305
48. Hogarth R.M., and Einhorn H.J. Order effects in belief updating: The belief-adjustment model. Cognitive Psychology 24 (1992) 1-55
49. Johnson E.J., Schulte-Mecklenbeck M., and Willernsen M.C. Process models deserve process data: Comment on Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, and Hertwig (2006). Psychological Review 115 (2008) 263-272
50. Juslin P. The overconfidence phenomenon as a consequence of informal experimenter-guided selection of almanac items. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 57 (1994) 226-246
51. Juslin P., Karlsson L., and Olsson H. Information integration in multiple-cue judgment: A division-of-labor hypothesis. Cognition 106 (2008) 259-298
52. Juslin, P., Nilsson, H., & Winman, A. (2009). Eliminating base-rate neglect and conjunction fallacies by formulating probabilistic inference problems in logarithms. Unpublished manuscript, Department of Psychology, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden.
53. Juslin P., Olsson H., and Björkman M. Brunswikian and Thurstonian origins of bias in probability assessment: On the interpretation of stochastic components of judgment. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 10 (1997) 189-209
54. Juslin P., Olsson H., and Olsson A.-C. Exemplar effects in multiple-cue judgment. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 132 (2003) 133-156
55. Juslin P., Wennerholm P., and Olsson H. Format-dependence in subjective probability calibration. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 25 (1999) 1038-1052
56. Juslin P., Winman A., and Hansson P. The naive intuitive statistician: A naive sampling model of intuitive confidence intervals. Psychological Review 114 (2007) 678-703
57. Juslin P., Winman A., and Olsson H. Naive empiricism and dogmatism in confidence research: A critical examination of the hard-easy effect. Psychological Review 107 (2000) 384-396
58. Juslin P., Winman A., and Olsson H. Calibration, additivity, and source independence of probability judgments in general knowledge and sensory discrimination tasks. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 92 (2003) 34-51
59. Kahneman D., and Frederick S. Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment. In: Gilovich T., Griffin D.W., and Kahneman D. (Eds). Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment (2002), Cambridge University Press, New York, NY 49-81
60. Kahneman D., Slovic P., and Tversky A. Judgments under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases (1982), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England
61. Kahneman D., and Tversky A. On the psychology of prediction. Psychological Review 80 (1973) 237-251
62. Kahneman D., and Tversky A. On the reality of cognitive illusions. Psychological Review 103 (1996) 582-591
63. Kareev Y., Arnon S., and Horwitz-Zeliger R. On the misperception of variability. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 131 (2002) 287-297
64. Karelaia N., and Hogarth R.M. Determinants of linear judgment: A meta-analysis of lens studies. Psychological Bulletin 134 (2008) 404-426
65. Kariyazono A. The study of conjunction fallacy in the probability judgment task of compound event. Japanese Journal of Psychonomic Science 10 (1991) 57-64
66. Kelley H., and Busemeyer J. A comparison of models for learning how to dynamically integrate multiple cues in order to forecast continuous criteria. Journal of Mathematical Psychology 52 (2008) 218-240
67. Koehler J.J. The base-rate fallacy reconsidered: Descriptive, normative and methodological challenges. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1996) 1-17
68. Libby R., and Lewis B.L. Human information processing research in accounting: The state of the art 1982. Organizations and Society 7 (1982) 231-285
69. Lopes L.L. Model-based decision and inference in stud poker. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 105 (1976) 217-239
70. Lopes L.L. Averaging rules and adjustment processes in Bayesian inference. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 23 (1985) 509-512
71. Lopes L.L. Procedural debiasing. Acta Psychologica 64 (1987) 167-185
72. Lopes L.L., and Ekberg P.H. Test of an ordering hypothesis of risky decision making. Acta Psychologica 45 (1980) 161-167
73. McKenzie C.R.M. The accuracy of intuitive judgment strategies: Covariation assessment and Bayesian inference. Cognitive Psychology 26 (1994) 209-239
74. Nilsson H. Exploring the conjunction fallacy within a category learning framework. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 21 (2008) 471-490
75. Nilsson H., Olsson H., and Juslin P. The cognitive substrate of subjective probability. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 31 (2005) 600-620
76. Nilsson, H., Winman, A., Juslin, P., & Hansson, G. (in press). Linda is not a bearded lady: Configural weighting and adding as the cause of extension errors. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
77. Ofir C. Pseudodiagnosticity in judgment under uncertainty. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 42 (1988) 343-363
78. Peterson C.R., and Beach L.R. Man as an intuitive statistician. Psychological Bulletin 68 (1967) 29-46
79. Rieskamp J. The probabilistic nature of preferential choice. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 34 (2008) 1446-1465
80. Roussel J.-L., Fayol M., and Barrouillet P. Procedural vs. direct retrieval strategies in arithmetic: A comparison between additive and multiplicative problem solving. European Journal of Cognitive Psychology 14 (2002) 61-104
81. Schlottman A., and Anderson N.A. Children's judgment of expected value. Developmental Psychology 30 (1994) 56-66
82. Shanteau J.C. An additive model for sequential decision making. Journal of Experimental Psychology 85 (1970) 181-191
83. Shanteau J.C. Descriptive versus normative models of sequential inference judgments. Experimental Psychology 93 (1972) 63-68
84. Shanteau J.C. Averaging versus multiplying combination rules of inference judgment. Acta Psychologica 39 (1975) 83-89
85. Simon H.A. Invariants of human behavior. Annual Review of Psychology 41 (1990) 1-19
86. Slovic P., and Lichtenstein S. Comparison of Bayesian and regression approaches to the study of information processing in judgment. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 6 (1971) 649-744
87. Stewart N., Chater N., and Brown G.D.A. Decision by sampling. Cognitive Psychology 53 (2006) 1-26
88. Tentori K., Bonini N., and Osherson D. The conjunction fallacy: A misunderstanding about conjunction?. Cognitive Science 28 (2004) 467-477
89. Thüring M., and Jungermann H. The conjunction fallacy: Causality vs. event probability. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 3 (1990) 61-74
90. Tversky A., and Kahneman D. Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science 185 (1974, September 27) 1124-1131
91. Tversky A., and Kahneman D. Evidential impact of base rates. In: Kahneman D., Slovic P., and Tversky A. (Eds). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases (1982), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England 153-160
92. Tversky A., and Kahneman D. Extensional vs. intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review 91 (1983) 293-315
93. Tversky A., and Koehler D.J. Support theory: A nonextensional representation of subjective probability. Psychological Review 101 (1994) 547-567
94. Wedell D.H., and Moro R. Testing boundary conditions for the conjunction fallacy: Effects of response mode, conceptual focus and problem type. Cognition 107 (2008) 105-136
95. Winman A. Knowing if you would have known: A model of the hindsight bias. Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis: Comprehensive Summaries of Uppsala Dissertations from the Faculty of Social Sciences 69 (1997)
96. Yates J.F., and Carlson B.W. Conjunction errors: Evidence for multiple judgment procedures, including "signed summation.". Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 37 (1986) 230-253