Linda Is Not a Bearded Lady: Configural Weighting and Adding as the Cause of Extension Errors

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

Volumn 138, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 517-534

  Nilsson, Håkan ^a,b   Winman, Anders ^a   Juslin, Peter ^a   Hansson, Göran ^a  

^a UPPSALA UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BASEL   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

conjunction error; disjunction error; probability; representative; weighted average

Indexed keywords

ADULT; ARTICLE; COGNITION; DECISION MAKING; FEMALE; HUMAN; MALE; PROBABILITY; PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT; PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; STUDENT; TASK PERFORMANCE;

ADULT; COGNITION; FEMALE; HUMANS; JUDGMENT; MALE; PROBABILITY; PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; STUDENTS; TASK PERFORMANCE AND ANALYSIS; YOUNG ADULT;

EID: 70449481650     PISSN: 00963445     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1037/a0017351     Document Type: Article

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