Source Reliability and the Conjunction Fallacy

Cognitive Science

Volumn 35, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 682-711

  Jarvstad, Andreas ^a   Hahn, Ulrike ^a  

^a CARDIFF UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Bayesian models; Conjunction fallacy; Source reliability; Subjective probability

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; ASSOCIATION; BAYES THEOREM; DECISION MAKING; HUMAN; LINGUISTICS; PROBABILITY; PROBLEM SOLVING; REPRODUCIBILITY; SEMANTICS; THEORETICAL MODEL;

ASSOCIATION; BAYES THEOREM; DECISION MAKING; HUMANS; JUDGMENT; MODELS, THEORETICAL; PROBABILITY; PROBLEM SOLVING; PSYCHOLINGUISTICS; REPRODUCIBILITY OF RESULTS; SEMANTICS;

EID: 79955888316     PISSN: 03640213     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1551-6709.2011.01170.x     Document Type: Article

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