Because Hitler did it! Quantitative tests of Bayesian argumentation using ad hominem

Thinking and Reasoning

Volumn 18, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 311-343

  Harris, Adam J L ^a   Hsu, Anne S ^a   Madsen, Jens K ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Argumentation; Bayesian probability; Fallacies; Reasoning

Indexed keywords

EID: 84862310283     PISSN: 13546783     EISSN: 14640708     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2012.670753     Document Type: Article

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