Automatic optimism: Biased use of base rate information for positive and negative events

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

Volumn 44, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 631-639

  Lench, Heather C ^a   Ditto, Peter H ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Affect heuristic; Base rates; Bias; Implicit bias; Likelihood judgments; Optimism; Optimistic bias

Indexed keywords

EID: 41549113732     PISSN: 00221031     EISSN: 10960465     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2007.02.011     Document Type: Article

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