The Heuristics and Biases Approach to Judgment Under Uncertainty

Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Intraindividual Processes

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 207-235

  Griffin, Dale ^a   Gonzalez, Richard ^a   Varey, Carol ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Cognitive psychology; Heart disease; Heuristics; Human judgment; Probability

Indexed keywords

EID: 84954578388     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1002/9780470998519.ch10     Document Type: Chapter

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