Norms of assertion and communication in social networks

Synthese

Volumn 190, Issue 13, 2013, Pages 2557-2571

  Olsson, Erik J ^a   Vallinder, Aron ^a  

^a LUND UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Bayesianism; Computer simulation; Norms of assertion; Probability; Social epistemology; Social network; Veritistic value

Indexed keywords

EID: 84881023546     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-013-0313-1     Document Type: Article

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