Pillars of prosperity: The political economics of development clusters

Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 1-375

  Besley, Timothy ^a   Persson, Torsten ^b  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84890657515     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Book

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