The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians

European Economic Review

Volumn 43, Issue 4-6, 1999, Pages 699-735

  Persson, Torsten ^a,b,c   Tabellini, Guido ^c,d  

^a STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

^b NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

^c CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^d BOCCONI UNIVERSITY   (Italy)

Author keywords

Electoral rules; Political economics; Political regimes; Public finance; Redistribution; Rents

Indexed keywords

COMPARATIVE STUDY; ELECTION; POLITICAL ECONOMY;

EID: 0032812549     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00131-7     Document Type: Article

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