Political culture and economic decline

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 16, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 189-213

  Hillman, Arye L ^a,b   Ursprung, Heinrich W ^c  

^a BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF KONSTANZ   (Germany)

Author keywords

H11; P30; Political culture; Political liberalization; Rent seeking; Transition

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000282824     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(00)00005-7     Document Type: Article

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