A model of political competition with citizen-candidates

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 111, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 65-96

  Osborne, Martin J ^a   Slivinski, Al ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0007662785     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2946658     Document Type: Article

References (25)

1. Alesina, Alberto, "Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters," American Economic Review, LXXVIII (1988), 796-805.
2. Besley, Timothy, and Stephen Coate, "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," Working Paper 95-02, Center for Analytic Research in Economics and the Social Sciences, University of Pennsylvania, 1995.
3. Black, Duncan, The Theory of Committees and Elections (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1958).
4. Calvert, Randall L., "Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate Motivations, Uncertainty, and Convergence," American Journal of Political Science, XXIX (1985), 69-95.
5. Cox, Gary W., "Duverger's Law and Strategic Voting," unpublished paper, Department of Government, University of Texas, Austin, 1987a.
6. _, "Electoral Equilibrium under Alternative Voting Institutions," American Journal of Political Science, XXXI (1987b), 82-108.
7. _, "Multicandidate Spatial Competition," Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting, J. M. Enelow and M. J. Hinich, eds. (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
8. Downs, Anthony, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957).
9. Duverger, Maurice, Political Parties (London, England: Methuen, 1954).
10. Feddersen, Timothy J., "A Voting Model Implying Duverger's Law and Positive Turnout," American Journal of Political Science, XXXVI (1992), 938-62.
11. Feddersen, Timothy J., Itai Sened, and Stephen G. Wright, "Rational Voting and Candidate Entry under Plurality Rule," American Journal of Political Science, XXXIV (1990), 1005-16.
12. Greeberg, Joseph, and Kenneth A. Shepsle, "The Effect of Electoral Rewards in Multiparty Competition with Entry," American Political Science Review, LXXXI (1987), 525-37.
13. Hotelling, Harold, "Stability in Competition," Economic Journal, XXXIX (1929).
14. Osborne, Martin J., "Candidate Positioning and Entry in a Political Competition," Games and Economic Behavior, V (1993), 133-51.
15. _, "Spatial Models of Political Competition under Plurality Rule: A survey of Some Explanations of the Number of Candidates and the Positions They Take," Canadian Journal of Economics, XXVIII (1995), 261-301.
16. Palfrey, Thomas R., "Spatial Equilibrium with Entry," Review of Economic Studies, LI (1984), 139-56.
17. _, "A Mathematical Proof of Duverger's Law," Models of Strategic Choice in Politics, Peter C. Ordeshook, ed. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989).
18. Roemer, John E., "A Theory of Policy Differentiation in Single Issue Electoral Politics," Social Choice and Welfare, XI (1994), 355-80.
19. Rogoff, Kenneth, "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," American Economic Review, LXXX (1990), 21-36.
20. Shepsle, Kenneth A., Models of Multiparty Electoral Competition (Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1991).
21. Tabellini, Guido, and Alberto Alesina, "Voting on the Budget Deficit," American Economic Review, LXXX (1990), 37-49.
22. Wittman, Donald, "Candidates with Policy Preferences: A Dynamic Model," Journal of Economic Theory, XIV (1977), 180-89.
23. _, "Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis of Alternative Theories," American Political Science Review, LXXVII (1983), 142-57.
24. _, "Spatial Strategies When Candidates Have Policy Preferences," Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting, James M. Enelow and Melvin J. Hinich, eds. (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
25. Wright, Stephen G., and William H. Riker, "Plurality and Runoff Systems and Numbers of Candidates," Public Choice, LX (1989), 155-75.