Sources of Inefficiency in a Representative Democracy: A Dynamic Analysis

American Economic Review

Volumn 88, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 139-156

  Besley, Timothy ^a   Coate, Stephen ^b  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0003076801     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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