Political institutions and policy choices: Evidence from the United States

Journal of Economic Literature

Volumn 41, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 7-73

  Besley, Timothy ^a   Case, Anne ^b  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038312467     PISSN: 00220515     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/jel.41.1.7     Document Type: Review

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