Politics and economics in weak and strong states

Journal of Monetary Economics

Volumn 52, Issue 7, 2005, Pages 1199-1226

  Acemoglu, Daron ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Economic growth; Economics of the government; Institutions; Political economy; Public goods

Indexed keywords

EID: 28244462824     PISSN: 03043932     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2005.05.001     Document Type: Article

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