Political predation and economic development

Economics and Politics

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 255-277

  Azam, Jean Paul ^a   Bates, Robert ^a   Biais, Bruno ^b  

^a TOULOUSE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (France)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; ECONOMIC GROWTH; GOVERNMENT; POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT; POLITICAL INTEGRATION; STATE ROLE; STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS;

EID: 67049153931     PISSN: 09541985     EISSN: 14680343     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2009.00345.x     Document Type: Article

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