Contracting for aid

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 70, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 25-58

  Azam, Jean Paul ^a   Laffont, Jean Jacques ^a  

^a Toulouse School of Economics   (France)

Author keywords

Aid; Contract; Poverty

Indexed keywords

AID POLICY; CONDITIONALITY; CONTRACTION; POVERTY ALLEVIATION;

EID: 0037324571     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3878(02)00085-8     Document Type: Article

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