The constitutional dilemma of economic liberty

Journal of Economic Perspectives

Volumn 19, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 89-108

  Weingast, Barry R ^a,b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 27744543736     PISSN: 08953309     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/089533005774357815     Document Type: Conference Paper

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