Endogenous constitutions

Economic Journal

Volumn 120, Issue 543, 2010, Pages 1-39

  Ticchi, Davide ^a   Vindigni, Andrea ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF URBINO   (Italy)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEVELOPMENT THEORY; ECONOMIC GROWTH; ECONOMIC THEORY; ENDOGENOUS GROWTH; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 76549111034     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: 14680297     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02309.x     Document Type: Article

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