A theory of civil conflict and democracy in rentier states

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Volumn 108, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 571-585

  Aslaksen, Silje ^a   Torvik, Ragnar ^a  

^a NORWEGIAN UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Norway)

Author keywords

Endogenous democratic institutions; Political economy; Resource curse

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRACY; ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHY; MODEL; POLITICAL ECONOMY; SOCIAL CONFLICT;

EID: 33845945853     PISSN: 03470520     EISSN: 14679442     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00471.x     Document Type: Article

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