Information, irrationality, and the evolution of trust

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 90, Issue , 2013, Pages

  Manapat, Michael L ^a,b   Nowak, Martin A ^a,b   Rand, David G ^a,c  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Evolutionary game theory; Reputation; Trust

Indexed keywords

EID: 84880324463     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2012.10.018     Document Type: Article

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