Imitation processes with small mutations

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 131, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 251-262

  Fudenberg, Drew ^a   Imhof, Lorens A ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Ergodic distribution; Imitation dynamics; Limit distribution; Markov chain

Indexed keywords

EID: 33750031286     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.04.006     Document Type: Article

References (27)

1. Apostol T.M. Mathematical Analysis (1974), Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA
2. Bergin J., and Lipman B. Evolution with state dependent mutations. Econometrica 64 (1996) 943-956
3. Bjonerstedt J., and Weibull J. Nash equilibrium and evolution by imitation. In: Arrow K., et al. (Ed). The Rational Foundations of Economic Analysis (1995), MacMillan, London
4. Duflo M. Algorithmes Stochastiques (1996), Springer, New York
5. Durrett R. Probability: Theory and Examples (1996), Duxbury Press, Belmont
6. Ellison G. Learning, local interaction, and coordination. Econometrica 61 (1993) 1047-1071
7. Ellison G. Basins of attraction, long-run stochastic stability, and the speed of step-by-step evolution. Rev. Econ. Stud. 67 (2000) 17-45
8. Ellison G., and Fudenberg D. Rules of thumb for social learning. J. Polit. Economy 101 (1993) 612-643
9. Ellison G., and Fudenberg D. Word of mouth communication and social learning. Quart. J. Econ. 110 (1995) 93-126
10. Foster D., and Young P. Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics. Theoretical Population Biol. 38 (1990) 219-232
11. Foster D., and Young P. A correction to the paper "Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics". Theoretical Population Biol. 51 (1997) 77-78
12. Freidlin M.I., and Wentzell A.D. Random Perturbations of Dynamical Systems (1984), Springer, New York
13. D. Fudenberg, L. Imhof, M. Nowak, C. Taylor, Stochastic evolution as a generalized Moran Process, Mimeo, 2004.
14. Fudenberg D., and Levine D. The Theory of Learning in Games (1998), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
15. Kandori M., Mailath G., and Rob R. Learning, mutation, and long run equilibria in games. Econometrica 61 (1993) 29-56
16. Kandori M., and Rob R. Evolution of equilibria in the long run. J. Econ. Theory 65 (1995) 383-414
17. Kandori M., and Rob R. Bandwagon effects and long run technology choice. Games Econ. Behav. 22 (1998) 30-60
18. Karandikar R., Mookherjee D., Ray D., and Vega-Redondo F. Evolving aspirations and cooperation. J. Econ. Theory 80 (1998) 292-331
19. Karlin S., and Taylor H. A First Course in Stochastic Processes (1975), Academic Press, New York
20. Kifer Y. A discrete-time version of the Wentzell-Freidlin theory. Ann. Probability 18 (1990) 1676-1692
21. Noldeke G., and Samuelson L. An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction. Games Econ. Behav. 5 (1993) 425-454
22. Nowak M.A., Sasaki A., Taylor C., and Fudenberg D. Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations. Nature 428 (2004) 646-650
23. Samuelson L. Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection (1997), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
24. Sandholm W. Simple and clever decision rules for a model of evolution. Econ. Lett. 61 (1998) 165-170
25. Schlag K. Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits. J. Econ. Theory 78 (1998) 130-156
26. Taylor C., Fudenberg D., Sasaki A., and Nowak M.A. Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations. Bull. Math. Biol. 66 (2004) 1621-1644
27. Young P. The evolution of conventions. Econometrica 61 (1993) 57-84