Evolution of preferences

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 74, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 685-704

  Dekel, Eddie ^a,b   Ely, Jeffrey C ^a   Yilankaya, Okan ^c  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^c UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC THEORY; EVOLUTIONARY THEORY; GAME THEORY; PREFERENCE BEHAVIOR; PROBABILITY;

EID: 34250722154     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: 1467937X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2007.00445.x     Document Type: Article

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