The evolution of antisocial punishment in optional public goods games

Nature Communications

Volumn 2, Issue 1, 2011, Pages

  Rand, David G ^a   Nowak, Martin A ^a,b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ANTISOCIAL PUNISHMENT; ARTICLE; CONTROLLED STUDY; COOPERATION; GAME; HUMAN; HUMAN EXPERIMENT; NORMAL HUMAN; PARAMETER; PREDICTION; PUBLIC GOODS GAME; PUNISHMENT; THEORY; EVOLUTION; FEMALE; HUMAN RELATION; MALE; PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; FEMALE; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS; MALE; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; PUNISHMENT; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

EID: 80052400882     PISSN: None     EISSN: 20411723     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1038/ncomms1442     Document Type: Article

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