Reputation helps solve the 'tragedy of the commons'

Nature

Volumn 415, Issue 6870, 2002, Pages 424-426

  Milinski, Manfred ^a   Semmann, Dirk ^a   Krambeck, Hans Jürgen ^a  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

SOCIAL ASPECTS;

PUBLIC GOODS;

BIODIVERSITY;

GLOBAL CLIMATE; GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE; PUBLIC GOODS; RECIPROCITY; RESOURCE AVAILABILITY; SUSTAINABILITY;

ARTICLE; COOPERATION; ECOLOGY; GAME; GLOBAL CLIMATE; PRIORITY JOURNAL; RESOURCE MANAGEMENT; REWARD; SOCIAL ASPECT; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; THEORY;

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAMES, EXPERIMENTAL; HUMANS; MODELS, ECONOMIC; REWARD; SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS; SOCIOLOGY;

EID: 0037165214     PISSN: 00280836     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1038/415424a     Document Type: Article

References (22)

1. The tragedy of the commons
2. Social dilemmas
3. The benefits of the commons
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5. Sustainability - Revisiting the commons: Local lessons, global challenges
6. Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring
7. The dynamics of indirect reciprocity
8. Evolution of cooperation between individuals
9. Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
10. Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups
11. Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments
12. Altruistic punishment in humans
13. Cooperation through image scoring in humans
14. Cooperation through indirect reciprocity: Image scoring or standing strategy?
15. Reward and punishment