Cooperation through indirect reciprocity: Image scoring or standing strategy?

Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences

Volumn 268, Issue 1484, 2001, Pages 2495-2501

  Milinski, M ^a   Semmann, D ^a   Bakker, T C M ^a   Krambeck, H J ^a  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Evolution of cooperation; Good standing; Image scoring; Indirect reciprocity

Indexed keywords

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGY; RECIPROCITY;

ARTICLE; ECOLOGY; EVOLUTION; HUMAN; IMAGE ANALYSIS; MEMORY; MODEL; PRIORITY JOURNAL; SCORING SYSTEM; THEORY;

EID: 0035824450     PISSN: 09628452     EISSN: 14712970     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2001.1809     Document Type: Article

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