A dynamic model of social network formation

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America

Volumn 97, Issue 16, 2000, Pages 9340-9346

  Skyrms, Brian ^a   Pemantle, Robin ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR; ARTICLE; ENVIRONMENT; INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION; NOISE; PRIORITY JOURNAL; REINFORCEMENT; SOCIAL INTERACTION; SOCIOLOGY;

BEHAVIOR; HUMANS; SOCIAL SUPPORT;

EID: 0034255271     PISSN: 00278424     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.97.16.9340     Document Type: Article

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