Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem

Nature

Volumn 432, Issue 7016, 2004, Pages 499-502

  Panchanathan, Karthik ^a   Boyd, Robert ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH; COSTS; STRATEGIC PLANNING;

COLLECTIVE ACTION; CONFORMISM; INDIRECT RECIPROCITY; META-PUNISHMENT; SECOND-ORDER FREE RIDER PROBLEM;

PROBLEM SOLVING;

EVOLUTION; RECIPROCITY;

ARTICLE; BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTION; HUMAN RELATION; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PUNISHMENT; SOCIAL INTERACTION; SOCIAL LIFE; THEORY;

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTION; GROUP PROCESSES; HUMANS; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; MUTATION; PUNISHMENT; RESEARCH DESIGN; SOCIAL CONFORMITY;

EID: 9644289531     PISSN: 00280836     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1038/nature02978     Document Type: Article

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