Delayed and Inconsistent Information and the Evolution of Trust

Dynamic Games and Applications

Volumn 2, Issue 4, 2012, Pages 401-410

  Manapat, Michael L ^a   Rand, David G ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Evolutionary dynamics; Evolutionary game theory; Reputation; Trust game

Indexed keywords

EID: 84870542910     PISSN: 21530785     EISSN: 21530793     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s13235-012-0055-6     Document Type: Article

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