Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations can explain the full range of cooperative behaviors observed in the centipede game

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 300, Issue , 2012, Pages 212-221

  Rand, David G ^a   Nowak, Martin A ^a,b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Backwards induction; Evolution of cooperation; Evolutionary game theory; Fixed length games; Weak selection

Indexed keywords

BEHAVIORAL ECOLOGY; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTIONARY THEORY; GAME THEORY; NATURAL SELECTION; POPULATION MODELING; STOCHASTICITY;

ARTICLE; BEHAVIOR; BEHAVIOR CHANGE; COGNITION; COOPERATION; DECISION MAKING; EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN; FIXED LENGTH GAME; GAME; GROUP DYNAMICS; HUMAN; NATURAL SELECTION; OUTCOME ASSESSMENT; POPULATION SIZE; PRIORITY JOURNAL; SOCIAL INTERACTION; SOCIAL PARTICIPATION; STOCHASTIC MODEL; TIME;

BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; MODELS, GENETIC; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; MUTATION RATE; SELECTION, GENETIC; STOCHASTIC PROCESSES;

CHILOPODA;

EID: 84856802823     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.01.011     Document Type: Article

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